These notes show the tools in Le Treust and Tomala (2017) extend to the case of multiple inequality and equality constraints. This showcases the power of the results in that paper to analyze problems of information design subject to constraints. In fact, we show in Doval and Skreta (2018) that they can be used to provide an upper bound on the number of posteriors a designer with limited commitment uses in his optimal mechanism. * The notes are currently in flux and will be updated soon to show how these tools can shed light on some results in the literature and open the door to analyzing new and exciting problems.
Introduction
In Doval and Skreta (2018) we establish a canonical class of mechanisms for limited commitment. Relying on this canonical class, we show how to characterize the principal's optimal mechanism by solving a constrained information design problem.
The results here provide tools to solve such general constrained information design problems. These problems are becoming common: Since Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) seminal paper on Bayesian persuasion, the literature on information design has grown steadily. A bulk of new work analyzes constrained information design problems, which can be classified in three groups 1. The information designer faces constraints additional to the Bayes' plausibility constraint in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) , like in Boleslavsky and Kim (2018) on persuasion and moral hazard, and Le Treust and Tomala (2017)) on information transmission with capacity constraints.
2. The information designer is designing a mechanism that satisfies incentive and participation constraints, like in Dworczak (2017) work on aftermarkets, Georgiadis and Szentes (2018) work on optimal monitoring in moral hazard, and in our own work Doval and Skreta (2018) canonical for limited commitment.
3. Mechanism design problems that do not involve information design and still can be solved using information design tools, like Dworczak et al. (2018) .
The typical approach to tackle these constrained information design problems is to set up a Lagrangian to incorporate the constraints into the objective function, except for the Bayes' plausibility constraint. If each constraint can be written as the expectation over posteriors of some function, then the Lagrangian itself can be written as an expectation over posteriors of some function given the Lagrange multiplier. If there are N possible states of the world, one may be tempted to apply Carathéodory's theorem and conclude from this that the optimal information policy uses at most N posteriors. After all, the solution to the problem would correspond to the concavification of the function whose expectation over posteriors determines the Lagrangian.
In an inspiring contribution, Le Treust and Tomala (2017) show that the above reasoning is flawed when the information designer faces one inequality constraint. At the heart of their result is the observation that the Lagrange multiplier is also part of the solution to the optimization problem. Indeed, they show that the solution corresponds to concavifying a function of N + 1 variables: the first N correspond to a belief and the last corresponds to the inequality constraint. It follows then that the optimal policy may involve N + 1 posteriors. The authors also show that the Lagrangian approach is valid for their problem.
In Doval and Skreta (2018) , the designer designs both an allocation rule and an information structure; both have to satisfy the agent's participation and incentive compatibility constraints. To show the upper bound on the number of posteriors that the designer uses in an optimal policy, we apply the extension of the results Le Treust and Tomala (2017) which we present in these notes. It is our hope that given the prevalence of constrained information design this simple extension is useful to other researchers.
Setting
Consider the following problem.
1 Let Ω be a finite set of states. Let f, g 1 , . . . , g r , g r+1 , . . . , g K : ∆(Ω) → R ∪ {−∞} be a tuple of functions defined on ∆(Ω). For µ ∈ ∆(Ω) and
Le Treust and Tomala (2017) consider the above problem for r = 1 and no equality constraints.
Result
Proposition 3.
Proof. The function cav f g 1 ,...,g K (µ, γ 1 , . . . , γ K ) is given by the following program:
Take a family (λ m , µ m , γ 1,m , . . . , γ K,m ) that is feasible for this program. Then, for l ≤ r, we have λ m g l (µ m ) ≥ m λ m γ l,m = γ m , and for l ∈ {r + 1, . . . , K}, we have
On the other hand, let (λ m , µ m ) such that m λ m µ m = µ and
Corollary 3.1. The solution to problem (1) uses at most N + K posteriors.
Proof. The result follows from Proposition 3.1 and an application of Caratheódory's theorem (see, e.g., Rockafellar (1970) 
Corollary 3.2. Suppose that in problem (1), only M < r inequality constraints bind. Then the solution to problem (1) uses at most N + M + K − r posteriors.
Proof. Suppose that in the solution to program cav g 1 ,...,g K f (µ, γ 1 , . . . , γ K ), M ≤ r constraints bind and r − M are slack. Then cav g 1 ,...,g K f (µ, γ 1 , . . . , γ K ) = cav g M ,g r+1 ,...,g K f (µ, γ M , γ r+1 , . . . , γ K ), where γ M is the projection of vector (γ 1 , . . . , γ r ) on the binding constraints and g M is the projection of vector (g 1 , . . . , g r ) on the set M. It follows from Proposition 3.1 that cav g M ,g r+1 ,...,g K f (µ, γ M , γ r+1 , . . . , γ K ) = cav f g M ,g r+1 ,...,g K (µ, γ M , . . . , γ r+1 , . . . , γ K ). Thus the solution to (1) uses at most N + M + K − r beliefs.
